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As the Internet has grown to be used by almost half of humanity andto comprise so many aspects of our personal, professional, social,and political lives, it has progressively ceased to be considered the
purely open, virtual space that some of its pioneers envisioned. (1) With the
emergence of complex, real-life issues, from content regulation to privacy,
copyright, and various forms of cybercrime (scams, fraud, identity theft,
etc.), there has been growing demand for regulation. 
Existing sources of regulation or governance are extremely diverse and
sometimes contradictory or overlapping. The laws of nation-states apply
to activities that take place on their territories. Internet service providers
set norms for online behaviour through contractual terms of use, which
apply globally. Economic and technical arrangements that are decided
within the technical community (such as the little-known Internet Engi-
neering Task Force) or amongst industry players (such as peer contracts
between Internet service providers) have critical effects on users’ oppor-
tunities and in shaping the general online ecosystem (think of the digital
divide). (2)
As the political implications of Internet governance have progressively
come to light, the challenge of building a coherent, global, and legitimate
Internet governance framework has also come to appear an almost impos-
sible target. Despite many attempts to bring together the global community
in various kinds of institutions and fora, from issue-based institutions such
as ICANN or the IETF to the more general UN-sponsored World Summit
on the Information Society, to the IGF and to Netmundial (3) and to innu-
merable bilateral and multilateral dialogues, “We have been improvising col-
lective governance arrangements for 15 years, and these improvisations
have so far failed to fully resolve the issues of legitimacy, adherence and
scope on a global basis.” (4)
The controversies around the proposed Internet governance frameworks
have raised profound theoretical issues and question basic assumptions
about the very nature of the Internet. For example, should the Internet be
considered a global common good when it is composed of interconnected
cables, routers, and digital services that are, for the most part, privately
owned? (5) Is the Internet really a borderless space as is often assumed, and
what are the implications for sovereign states? (6) How can institutional in-
novations such as the much-debated multistakeholder model be charac-
terised in terms of representing the interests of various actors and political
legitimacy? (7) Normative preferences on the ideal framework(s) for Internet
governance are highly dependent on the theoretical understanding one may
have of these issues.
Meanwhile, China has played an increasingly visible role in these debates
through its government representatives, technical community, private sec-
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tor, and users. Its impact on the Internet’s infrastructure, standards, markets,
and global governance has drawn more attention in recent years. (8) In par-
ticular, the fact that China pioneered Internet censorship, notably through
content filtering tools known as the Great Firewall, as well as the insistence
of Chinese officials on the notion of cybersovereignty, have raised debates
on whether Chinese leaders intend to build a separate network similar to a
Chinese “intranet.” However, China’s Internet infrastructures and services
are increasingly globalised and interconnected, while officials have com-
bined strong discourses on cybersovereignty with actual cooperation in a
number of concrete domains, particularly by sending participants to nu-
merous Internet governance fora and dialogues.
In this article, I intend to explore the apparently ambivalent foundations
of the notion of cybersovereignty as seen from China, through some of the
most recent Chinese academic literature on global Internet governance. 
After a short summary of the positions taken by Chinese representatives
on the topic in recent years, I will turn to a sampling of 13 academic arti-
cles from the CNKI database for a deeper analysis of the theoretical as-
sumptions behind the Chinese positions and strategy in Internet
governance (part 1). I will first show that the sampled articles conceive of
the current Internet order as an anarchic or disorderly space where global
hegemons reproduce their domination over the world in the digital age
(part 2). In the rather dichotomous world that this portrays, most of the
authors concentrate their attention on the position and strategy of the
United States with a view to underlining the contradictions in American
discourse through the PRISM scandal or the status of ICANN (part 3). In
this context, most scholars studied here see the current debates on Internet
governance as an opportunity to rebalance the global Internet order and
advance the strategic interests of China through the establishment of an
intergovernmental Internet governance framework in the long term, and
through active participation in the current status quo in the short term
(part 4). This leads me to conclude that there is as yet little belief in the
notion of the Internet as a global common good among mainstream aca-
demic views of the Internet in China. 
A position on cybersovereignty that
deserves further scrutiny
During the 2000s, China expressed a relatively vocal criticism of the cur-
rent Internet governance institutions and status quo, mostly because the
“multistakeholder” model of governance (adopted by ICANN among others)
only gives a marginal place to governments, and it is viewed in China as
favouring American and Western interests. (9) The Chinese leadership, how-
ever, seemed to have adopted a rather more cooperative attitude in the
early 2010s. For example, Chinese representatives were sent to participate
in the Governmental Advisory Committee of ICANN after nearly a decade
of interruption, and Chinese representatives seemed to be less vocal about
their demand to put the Internet into an intergovernmental framework,
even expressing some support for the multistakeholder model of represen-
tation. Lu Wei, the head of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC),
and Jack Ma, CEO of the Chinese Internet giant Alibaba, are both members
of the board of Netmundial, a forum on Internet governance that also ac-
commodates participation from a broad range of society. This increased
participation was analysed either as the sign of a pragmatic approach by
the Chinese government (10) or as a more profound change in strategy and
attitude on the international stage, related in part to China’s new confidence
in its own capacity to defend its interests within the existing global gover-
nance framework. (11)
However, the notion of cybersovereignty has remained the bottom-line of
China’s cyber policy and diplomacy, and it has been consistently asserted in
various official documents and declarations, starting with the milestone
White Paper on the Internet in China published by the State Council in
2010. (12) This document notably emphasised that “the Internet of various
countries belongs to different sovereignties, which makes it necessary to
strengthen international exchanges and cooperation in this field. (…) China
supports the establishment of an authoritative and just international Internet
administration organization under the UN system through democratic pro-
cedures on a worldwide scale.” Similarly, a White Paper on Diplomacy (13)
published in 2013 emphasised the concept of territorial sovereignty and
stressed that China “opposes the use of the Internet to interfere with other
countries’ domestic politics.” Article 1 of the draft Cybersecurity law, pub-
lished in July 2015 for public comment, states: “This law is formulated so as
to ensure network security, to preserve cyberspace sovereignty, national se-
curity, and societal public interest.” (14) Generally speaking, the notion of cy-
bersovereignty that China advocates implies that each country should be
able to police its own domestic Internet, without interference from other
countries (such as circumvention tools provided by foreign entities), let alone
attacks on the domestic Internet infrastructure and information system.
On the international stage, Chinese representatives did not give up efforts
to push the agenda of building an intergovernmental framework for Internet
governance. In 2011, China teamed up with Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajik-
istan to propose (without success) a Code of Conduct for Information Se-
curity (15) to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This document,
which pleaded for “multilateral, transparent and democratic international
Internet governance,” was later amended and proposed again to the General
Assembly in January 2015. (16) The amended wording incorporates the notion
of cooperating with social actors, but it still insists on the need for an in-
tergovernmental framework, and puts the responsibility to define the
26 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 6 / 2
8. Milton Mueller, “China and Global Internet Governance,” in Ronald Deibert, Rafal Rohozinski, and
Jonathan Zittrain (eds), Access Contested, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2012, pp. 177-194; Scott
Livingston, “Beijing Touts ‘Cyber-Sovereignty’ in Internet Governance: Global Technology Firms
Could Mine Silver Lining,” China Law Blog, 19 February 2015, www.chinalawblog.com/
2015/02/beijing-touts-cyber-sovereignty-in-internet-governance-global-technology-firms-could-
mine-silver-lining.html (accessed on 19 October 2015).
9. For more on China and ICANN, see Séverine Arsène, “Internet Domain Names in China: Articulating
Local Control with Global Connectivity,” China Perspectives, No. 2015/4, pp. 25-34.
10. “Due to these pre-emptive moves, and because of China’s realization after WSIS that ICANN was
not going to go away,” Milton Mueller, “China and Global Internet Governance,” art. cit., p. 183.
11. Séverine Arsène, “The Impact of China on Global Internet Governance in an Era of Privatized Con-
trol,” communication at the Chinese Internet Research Conference, Los Angeles, 2012,
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00704196 (accessed on 19 October 2015).
12. Information Office of the State Council, “White Paper: The Internet in China,” 15 June 2010,
http://china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm (accessed on 13 October 2015).
13. “2013 Zhongguo waijiao baipishu: Zhongguo weihu lingtu zhuquan juexin jianding” (2013 China
White Paper on Diplomacy: China is firmly determined to safeguard territorial sovereignty), Ren-
min wang via Tianya, 17 July 2013, http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-worldlook-827386-1.shtml (accessed
on 19 August 2015).
14. National People’s Congress Standing Committee, “Wangluo anquanfa (cao’an)” (Draft cyberse-
curity law), 6 July 2015, www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/2015-07/06/content_
1940614.htm, trans. China Law Translate, http://chinalawtranslate.com/cybersecuritydraft/?lang
=en (both accessed on 13 October 2015).
15. People’s Republic of China et al., “International Code of Conduct for Information Security,” United
Nations, 12 September 2011, https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/UN-150113-
CodeOfConduct.pdf (accessed on 13 October 2015).
16. People’s Republic of China et al., “International Code of Conduct for Information Security (revised
version),” United Nations, 13 January 2015, https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/
UN-110912-CodeOfConduct_0.pdf (accessed on 13 October 2015).
Special feature
boundaries of information rights within the hands of states, according to
their own definition of national security and public order. Similarly, at the
2012 Budapest Conference on Cyber Issues, (17) Chinese Ambassador Huang
Huikang proposed five principles directly inspired by the 1950s notion of
peaceful coexistence, of which sovereignty is first. (18) The motto of the
World Internet Conference organised by China in Wuzhen in November
2014, “An interconnected world shared and governed by all,” (19) should cer-
tainly not be interpreted in an overly literal way, as a proposed – but finally
abandoned – Wuzhen declaration included wording on the need to “respect
Internet sovereignty of all countries.” (20) As a confirmation of this position,
in December 2014, Lu Wei published an op-ed in the Huffington Post enti-
tled “Cyber Sovereignty Must Rule Global Internet.” (21)
In April 2015, an important cyberattack on the American web platform
Github further complicated the interpretation of China’s claim for cybersov-
ereignty. Github had been used for some time by activist organisations to
host content blocked by the Chinese censorship system. An analysis of the
tools used, nicknamed the “Great Cannon” by the Citizen Lab, showed that
it most likely came from the same infrastructures as the state-sponsored
Great Firewall of China. (22) This unprecedented action showed that China
was ready to take action beyond its territory in order to guarantee the ef-
ficiency of information control within China. This event thus contributed to
blurring the notion of “non-interference,” which had been a core principle
in China’s diplomacy for decades.
Unfolding the theoretical assumptions behind
“cybersovereignty” in China
The Chinese official press (23) provides fascinating but limited insights into
these ideological and strategic trends. For example, D. Bandurski has noted
a sharp increase in the use of the term “cybersovereignty” in the Chinese
press since 2010, which clearly reflects the fact that the Chinese leadership
had concentrated their efforts on this question even before Xi Jinping took
power. (24) However, in the absence of transparency on the internal political
debates within the PRC, such editorials can only raise more questions on
the decision-making processes and relative influence of the various admin-
istrations and factions of the Communist Party. (25) As R. Creemers notes, in
a context of administrative streamlining and competition, “it is difficult to
gauge to what extent such claims [for more assertiveness] reflect true con-
cerns about national security, rather than bureaucratic positioning in pursuit
of budget appropriations.” (26) In fact, these materials provide more infor-
mation about the theoretical concepts and visions that circulate among
the Chinese political elites and mainstream intellectuals than accurate in-
formation about the short-term strategic intentions of the current leader-
ship, although the two aspects are related.
This article intends to dig deeper in this direction through the analysis of
a sampling of recent Chinese academic literature on the topic. To identify
a small set of key research articles and authors, I used the CNKI database
to sample 13 key articles by ten authors. In the category about “Chinese
politics and international politics” (Zhongguo zhengzhi yu guoji zhengzhi
中 国 政 治 与 国 际 政 治 ), I searched the keyword “cyberspace” (wangluo
kongjian 网络空间), which is generally used in this database to tag articles
on global cyberpolicy. The vast majority of this literature is in fact focused
on the question of cybersecurity, and another important group of articles
dealing with US-China relations is also mostly about cybersecurity issues.
While it is important to note this orientation of Chinese scholarship, I de-
cided to focus on a smaller group of articles that analyse global Internet
governance and the notion of cybersovereignty in a more specific and com-
prehensive way, and therefore excluded from my selection the articles that
are solely focused on China-US bilateral relations or on narrow themes such
as cybersecurity or cybercrime. Among the more than 400 results, I hand-
picked the articles that more specifically dealt with global Internet gover-
nance, which were in the minority. Most of these articles were also tagged
under the keyword “cybersovereignty” (wangluo zhuquan 网络主权). An-
other search for “Internet governance” (wangluo zhili 网络治理) returned
1,774 results more often focused on domestic governance issues such as
e-government, control of public opinion, and cybercrime. Another field of
research revolves around governance of intellectual property or e-com-
merce. Although all these fields of research touch upon global Internet gov-
ernance in some respect, notably through specific institutions such as
ICANN or the WTO, defining Internet sovereignty or global governance is
generally not their central focus. 
The authors of the sampled articles are generally midcareer teaching or
research staff at major universities, such as Tan Youzhi, assistant professor
at the Institute of International Relations, University of Business and Eco-
nomics in Beijing, Gao Wanglai, assistant professor at the Department of
International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing, or Shen
Yi, associate professor at the Institute for International Relations and Public
Affairs, Fudan University in Shanghai. One author, Lu Chuanying, is a re-
searcher in a prominent think tank, the Shanghai Institutes for International
Studies. Although it is hard to assess the influence of these intellectuals be-
yond academic circles, some of them have published editorials in the Chi-
nese and foreign press, (27) which suggests that their views are shared by at
least some factions within the Chinese Party-state. 
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Due to the exclusive focus on academic publications and exclusion of cy-
bersecurity articles, some important authors do not appear in this sampling,
such as Zhang Li, (28) from the China Institutes of Contemporary Interna-
tional Relations, or Xu Longdi, (29) from the China Institute of International
Studies, a think tank that belongs to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
This narrow selection can obviously not be considered exhaustive or with-
out flaws. However, I hope that it will provide a glimpse of current academic
points of view on Internet governance in China, and an opportunity for more
detailed analysis of the wording and theoretical assumptions used in this
emerging literature. As this field of research is largely oriented towards pub-
lic policy expertise, and almost all authors provide recommendations for
the defence of the interests of China and the Chinese government, these
articles are also particularly worth studying for their normative dimensions.
Of course, as the last few years have been marked by enhanced crackdowns
on opinion leaders, it can be assumed that published scholarship – as well
as editorials – will mostly feature rather mainstream points of view, albeit
with slight variations (mainly in the type of recommendations) depending
on the authors’ position and disciplinary background. Overall, the views ex-
pressed in this sample are highly homogenous. 
The global Internet, an anarchic space where
hegemons are imposing their order
An anarchic space
For most authors, the reflection on global Internet governance starts with
the common observation that the Internet has historically developed in a
largely non-organised way, and its transnational character (kuaguoxing 跨
国性) makes it more difficult for sovereign countries to enforce their do-
mestic rules and maintain social order. Social and political movements (such
as the Arab Spring), hackers and cyberattacks, cybercrime, cyberspying, and
misuse of personal data are cited among the most worrying phenomena
confronting governments with political, social, economic, or cultural chal-
lenges.
For example, the global Internet is described by Tan Youzhi 檀有志 (30) as
an “anarchy” (wuzhengfu zhuangtai 无政府状态) and “an uncharted terri-
tory” (wuzhi lingyu 无知领域) “from the legal, political, security points of
view” where “authority, transparency, and responsibilities are not clari-
fied.” (31) For that reason, he describes the Internet as a “fifth frontier” 
(di wu jie 第五界) in addition to those of land, sea, air and space (p. 30),
using notions drawn from security studies. (32)
The notion of order (zhixu 秩序) – or the lack of it – is ubiquitous in this
group of articles, and in most cases it is used to justify why China should
pay attention to global Internet governance. For instance, Gao Wanglai 高
望 来 (33) speaks of a “lost order of cyberspace in the information era” 
(xinxishidai wangluo kongjian de shixu 信息时代网络空间的失序). (34) But
beyond threats to social and political stability, which are the focus of many
articles oriented towards cybersecurity, these articles also point to a
broader, more systemic analysis of the changing world order and to the
changing position of China in this landscape. For Shen Yi 沈 逸 , (35) for 
example, the Internet has developed as an “anarchy” where “all sorts of
actors use their own practices to enlarge their space for action, to obtain
more resources, acquire and use the right to define the rules, and turn the
definition of their own particular interests into determined codes of action
in cyberspace.” (36)
The digital divide and political, economic, cultural
domination
The idea that the global Internet is a totally unruly space, out of reach of
jurisdictions, is however increasingly debated. In fact it could even be argued
that one issue is that the Internet is subject to too much regulation, with
conflicts of jurisdictions that render national laws difficult to enforce. (37)
The authors here also describe how states are retaliating by adjusting na-
tional regulation and asserting a more important role in Internet gover-
nance. But until states obtain more control of the Internet, the current
status quo is described here as one in which infrastructure and platform de-
sign and ownership, copyright, and other technical features of the Internet,
which often incorporate the libertarian views of involved engineers, (38) have
been shaping and channelling Internet behaviours in a more powerful way
than the laws of any country. This angle of analysis seems in part derived
from the work of Lawrence Lessig on normative effects of technical code, (39)
but whereas Lessig concludes with the necessity of better defining common
interests and protecting citizens’ rights, the focus here is more on the effects
of technological inequalities on China’s position in the international world
order. The general argument defended here is that the low institutionalisa-
tion of the Internet has in fact rearranged the world order in a way that has
benefited the more technologically advanced countries and actors and thus
exacerbated global inequalities from a number of social, cultural, political,
economic, and strategic perspectives. 
A common focus of the articles is the “asymmetry” (bu duichenxing 不对
称性, ex. Gao Wanglai p. 54) between developed and developing countries,
and the “monopoly” (longduan 垄断) of developed countries on certain key
infrastructures, which have long given them the capacity to take advantage
of the opportunities of the digital age and to set the rules of Internet gov-
ernance. Shen Yi takes several indicators of the global digital divide, such as
Internet access rates and infrastructures, as proof of the dependency of de-
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veloping countries on assets owned and provided by developed countries.
For instance, he underlines that European and American companies enjoy
de facto dominance over the market of submarine cables, and that the US
and Japan lead the market in server hardware providers. This creates a con-
figuration of “centre-periphery” (zhongxin – waiwei 中心－ 外围, p. 150),
which he believes is detrimental to China. This argument is in sharp contrast
to the view of many countries such as the US, Australia, or European coun-
tries, which are concerned by the rise of Chinese manufacturing giants such
as Huawei and ZTE in global markets. 
For Yang Rongjun 杨嵘均, (40) the dividing line is not only between devel-
oped and developing countries, but also between developing countries ac-
cording to their level of modernisation. It translates into very different
visions of cyberspace and cybersovereignty:
Developed countries think that cyberspace is a “global public do-
main” (quanqiu gongyu 全球公域), whereas developing countries
think that cyberspace has a sovereign nature. (…) As developing
countries, socialist countries generally support a cybersovereignty
with more content, and a higher level of intervention of the state in
cyberspace. On the other side, more Westernised countries such as
India or South Korea, as developing countries that received more in-
fluences from Western thinking on freedom and democracy, put
more emphasis on entrusting citizens and giving them more rights
(…). The lower the level of modernisation, the larger the scope of cy-
bersovereignty. (41)
Yang sees in this phenomenon “the mutation of colonialism into the in-
formation society”:
[Western countries] use various means to advance colonialism in cy-
berspace through cybertechnologies and information technologies.
For a large number of developing countries, because of their back-
wardness in cybertechnologies and information technologies, there
is no other option than to accept the international Internet system
and cyberspace order established by powerful capitalist countries 
(p. 85).
According to him, this new form of colonialism is not only the result of
historical contingencies but is still at play through the influence exerted by
Western media production and propaganda: 
In general, because developed countries occupy superior economic,
political, and cultural positions, and also have absolute superiority in
the production of online information, they can infiltrate the ideology
of target countries with their political positions, visions of life and
values etc., through unlimited propaganda. (p. 82)
In other authors’ views, the cultural influence of the global Internet on
developing countries is not limited to the circulation of content but is also
a result of the values and principles incorporated within the technological
infrastructure and governance mechanisms, as in the article by Lu Chuan-
ying 鲁传颖: (42)
The unity of the Internet means that cyberspace was discovered and
created in the West, and its standards, values, and culture are all
based on Western civilisation. When they adopt the Internet, other
countries must also adopt the Internet’s leading culture and they
cannot introduce their own cultures into cyberspace. In this context,
the cultural sovereignty (wenhua zhuquan 文化主权) of developing
countries is strongly challenged (yanzhong chongji 严重冲击) by the
civilisation and values of the West. (43)
This vision somewhat echoes research in political economy that focused
on the structural inequalities and dependencies of media infrastructures,
and on one-way information flows that have long inundated developing
countries from the West. (44) These conclusions focused global attention on
the digital divide as early as the end of the 1970s. This stream of scholarship,
largely inspired by the work of Gramsci, emphasised the importance of cul-
tural content and infrastructure as an element of cultural domination and
capitalist “hegemony.” (45)
The concept of hegemony (baquan 霸权) has long been a common key-
word in the official doctrine of the Communist Party, and it is clearly a major
starting point in Chinese studies of global Internet governance. However, in
this group of articles it is not used in reference to the Gramscian concept
of hegemony. In lieu of a critique of global capitalism, the notion is used
here to denounce American and Western domination over the global Inter-
net, mostly using references from strategic studies and reports published in
the United States (including references by Western authors criticising in-
formation control). 
Moreover, when asserting that media content has unidirectional effects on
audiences, they tend to exaggerate the supposed uniformity of content pro-
duced and circulated on the global Internet, and to overlook the development
of academic research on media reception, (46) which shows that audiences
have much more agency than suggested here through the complex processes
of consumption, interpretation, and discussion of media content. The cultur-
alist and simplistic vision presented here of a “Western” culture, different from
and opposed to “Chinese” culture, is also quite weak theoretically.
The US as a hegemon seeking to perpetuate
its domination
Although the articles vary slightly in the way they regroup the winners
and losers of the current global Internet (dis)order, they all reflect a dichoto-
mous vision of the world, where the United States is the leading actor and
where China falls into the disadvantaged group. Explanations range from
mere historic contingencies to China being purposely antagonised by other
superpowers, as in Huang Zhixiong’s 黄志雄 (47) analysis:
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When China joined the international governance of the Internet, at
first it was out of a need to “passively respond” (beidong yingdui 被
动应对) to the pressures and attacks launched by the West on a va-
riety of concrete issues. (…) Some Western governments and media,
out of a need to establish imaginary enemies (jiaxiangdi 假想敌),
continue to spin the theory of the “Chinese cyberthreat” (Zhongguo
wangluo weixie 中国网络威胁) (…) The chess game that is centred
on the international order and regulation of cyberspace has created
two camps, with the United States, Europe, and other Western coun-
tries on one side and China, Russia, and other newly developed coun-
tries on the other side. (48)
Tan Youzhi also sees the current situation as a competition between
hegemons (baquanguo 霸权国) and other big Internet countries (wangluo
daguo 网络大国). Despite nominal equality between them, “in reality there
is a hierarchical structure where countries occupy different ranks depending
on their strength.” Even if other countries have acquired equivalent re-
sources, from this perspective, they remain in a subaltern position. Accord-
ing to Tan, the unequal world order is now actively maintained by the
United States:
The US is not only seeking to guarantee its own security but is also
actively seeking a leadership role in the management of the global
Internet. This leadership role is not only based on technological su-
periority but also on all the fields where free activities bear no bound-
aries or reprisals. (...) As an Internet hegemon, the US meticulously
suppressed the proposal by China, the Russian federation, Kazakhstan,
and Uzbekistan at the 66th UN plenary session on 12 September
2011 to establish an International Code of Conduct for Information
Security, which aimed at combating terrorism, separatism, extrem-
ism, and destruction of other country’s political, economic, and social
stability. (pp. 35-36)
The Code of Conduct is often mentioned as an example of the perceived
active strategy of the United States to undermine any attempt to change
the current balance of power through institutional means, and of its hypo-
critical use of principles such as freedom of information or civil society par-
ticipation.
Similarly, Lu Chuanying writes that the US is using its “monopoly” (long-
duan) on basic infrastructure and governance organisations “to further blur
the boundaries, and to extend its own cyberpower into the space of weak
countries” (p. 79):
The US believes that cyberspace is a “global public domain” (quanqiu
gongyu 全球公域), and that countries should not exert their sover-
eignty in cyberspace. But in reality, the strategic goal of the US is to
seize the resources and power of those spaces that cannot be char-
acterised as states (mei you mingque guojia shuxing kongjian 没有
明确国家属性空间) through the hegemony it has established in the
global public domain. (...) Without the protection of sovereignty, the
US can use its superiority in coercive cyberpower and institutional
cyberpower (qiangzhixing wangluoquan he zhiduxing wangluoquan
强制性网络权和制度性网络权) to undermine (weishe 威慑) the cy-
bersecurity of other countries, and to enter and control other coun-
tries’ cyberspace resources at will. (p. 80)
For Lu, the supposedly open, inclusive concept of multistakeholderism is
in fact a tool to advance the interests of strong countries. Despite the fact
that its promoters “believe that the role of state actors, private companies,
NGOs, academic groups, and individuals is as essential to the openness,
prosperity, transparency as that of states alone,” they still tend to turn to
states whenever security issues arise (p. 79).
This vision of China being the constant target and victim of American
domination is directly symmetrical to frequent accusations of China being
one of the main sources of cyberattacks in the world. (49) It is in line with
the official discourse of the Chinese government, which in turn claims that
China is the world's largest victim of cyberattacks. (50)
ICANN as an instrument of American institutional
domination
The case of Internet domain names (51) has attracted the most interest,
probably because this issue is better known to the larger public. One fre-
quent criticism relayed by Chinese authors is that the great majority of root
servers, which help direct traffic towards the appropriate locations, are sit-
uated in the United States, which is seen as a major cybersecurity risk for
the rest of the world (Tan Youzhi p. 39). 
Besides this criticism on the geographical concentration of key Internet
traffic infrastructure, a global controversy around the governance framework
of domain names is also developing. ICANN, or the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers, oversees the allocation of Internet ad-
dresses at a global level and thus plays a critical role in the Internet’s sta-
bility and security as well as equitable distribution of resources. Founded in
1998, the private non-profit corporation based in the United States is per-
haps the most well-known example of a “multistakeholder” model of gov-
ernance that seeks to include a variety of actors of the industry, along with
civil society and engaged individuals, with a consultative role for states. It
has, however, consistently been criticised by many actors, notably devel-
oping countries, for its unbalanced and complicated decision-making
processes, which tend to favour industry actors and Western interests, and
for its sustained links with the US government, through the “stewardship”
(control) role of the US National Telecommunications and Information Ad-
ministration, over one of ICANN’s core missions, the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA). (52)
The Chinese government has long been among the fiercest critics of
ICANN’s multistakeholder scheme, which is described in this set of articles
as an instrument of the American domination strategy, as in Wang Mingguo
王明国: (53)
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To put an end to the American monopoly on the Internet sphere and
implement a pluralistic, democratic, and transparent international
governance system, it is necessary to accelerate the reform of
ICANN. (…) Overall, ICANN embodies the American Internet gover-
nance project, which the US created thanks to its technological su-
periority, and which prevents other countries from obtaining some
control over cyberspace. In that way, it perpetuates American hege-
mony and dominance (baquan he tongzhi diwei 霸权和统治地位). (54)
Lu Chuanying takes the example of the .iq (Iraq) domain name to argue
that the US is effectively using the domain name system to advance its
strategic interests: 
The United States government has in the past forbidden the resolu-
tion of particular domain names, which makes other countries dis-
appear on the Internet, causing them great political and economic
losses as well as social turbulence. (…) In 2001, before the war, the
American government instructed ICANN to stop the resolution serv-
ice for the Iraq .iq country code top-level domain name, which led
websites in Iraq to completely stop service, and caused severe social,
political, and economic unrest. (p. 79)
Although Chinese experts often cite this episode, the official account of
the story by IANA is that the corporation that had received delegation for
the .iq domain name never really implemented it, and its managers, based
in the US, were suspected of criminal activities. As a consequence, the .iq
domain was left dormant until ICANN redelegated it in cooperation with
the post-war government in 2005. (55)
The American administration announced in 2014 that it is willing to trans-
fer its overseeing role on IANA to another body under certain conditions,
thereby launching a large-scale debate and reform process within ICANN
(which was still generating controversy at the time of writing). Although
generally welcomed by Chinese observers, this announced reform is also
seen with a certain degree of scepticism, as in Gao Wanglai’s analysis:
This action may look like a withdrawal, but in reality it is only a
strategic measure to acquire leadership on the multilateral chess
board (boyi zhong zhengduo zhudao quan suo caiqu de zhanlüe 
cuoshi 博弈中争夺主导权所采取的战略措施 p. 56).
PRISM and the “double standard” in American
discourse 
The PRISM scandal, (56) in which Edward Snowden revealed the global extent
of the American NSA’s online surveillance, is also mentioned in nearly all ar-
ticles to debunk American rhetoric, for example in Huang Zhixiong’s article:
The United States has used its technological superiority and monop-
oly on cyber-resources to conduct sustained and large-scale moni-
toring and secrets theft against many countries, including China. 
(p. 138) 
For Shen Yi, PRISM also revealed the cooperation between the US govern-
ment and the private sector, which enabled their surveillance capacity to
reach the entire world. For him, empowering the private sector is in fact a
way to seek “overwhelming hegemony” (yadaoxing baquan youshi 压倒性
霸权优势 p. 152) rather than the disinterested support of civil society. 
In Lu Chuanying’s view, the PRISM scandal underlines the fact that the US
has adopted “double standards” (shuangchong biaozhun 双重标准) when it
comes to the concept of Internet sovereignty: 
When the US gathers countries’ online data, or interferes with other
countries’ cyberpolicies, it claims that cyberspace is a “global public
domain.” When it wants to increase online supervision or enhance
public-private cooperation domestically, then it either thinks that cy-
berspace is a sovereign sphere or that basic Internet infrastructure is
privately-owned and that the country has jurisdiction over it. (p. 80)
Other, less well-known examples are also mentioned, such as the fact that
Microsoft blocked access to its Messenger services to users in Cuba, Iran,
Sudan, North Korea, and Syria as part of an American trade embargo in
2009 (57) (Yang Rongjun p. 82).
Liu Yangyue 刘杨钺 (58) and Yang Yixin 杨一心 (59) also point at the perceived
hypocrisy of American discourse in a context of proliferation of cybersecu-
rity threats:
The United States, (…) on the one hand calls out for cyber-liberalism
and pleads in favour of the existing international Internet governance
system in the name of openness and freedom, but on the other hand
the practice of cyberthreat and cyberattacks and other military
strategies has objectively promoted the trend of cyber-securitisation,
enhanced support for cybersovereignty, and accelerated the decline
of the Internet governance system that it intends to protect. Seen
from this perspective, the inherent logic of the hegemonic cyber-
strategy of the US is undoubtedly contradictory. (60)
In the same excerpt, Liu and Yang insist on the necessity of limiting the
US’s strategic hegemony by initiating international control over cyber-
weapons (wangluo junbei kongzhi 网络军备控制). Such control would be
“both a clear-headed recognition of the current situation of militarisation
of cyberspace and a limitation to the de facto American deterrence (weishe
威慑) and pre-emptive strategy (xianfazhiren zhanlüe 先发制人战略).”
Overall, and despite the fact that I voluntarily excluded articles exclusively
focused on China-US relations, the question of global Internet governance
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is mainly studied through the lens of American domination and its impact
on China, not only in terms of cybersecurity – which is a main concern –
but also in terms of economic and cultural domination, which are also per-
ceived as potentially conducive to social unrest.
Between intergovernmental preferences and
the multistakeholder status quo
Historic opportunity
As they are focused on making policy recommendations for the defence
of China’s interests, and marginally for the general interest, all authors see
the current context as a key opportunity for China to acquire a place and
voice (huayuquan 话语权) that is commensurate with its new status as a
cyberpower (wangluo daguo 网络大国). 
First, the American role in Internet governance is increasingly questioned
by global actors, particularly after the revelations of the NSA’s cyberspying.
Secondly, in a context of global concern over cyberterrorism and cyber-
crime, states have stepped up efforts to intervene in Internet governance.
Most articles also mention the fact that many Western countries have pub-
lished cyberstrategy reports and that China should do so too. Moreover, the
announcement of a reform of ICANN is seen as a sign that current institu-
tional arrangements can now be questioned with a view to finding a new
balance of power between the various stakeholders, or perhaps even to seek
a completely different governance framework. The demographics of the In-
ternet have also changed considerably, with the largest online populations
now being in China, India and other developing countries, which calls for
better representation of these countries in global Internet governance. 
All these arguments lead the Chinese scholars to consider that China has
a move to play on the “chess board” (boyi 博弈) of global Internet gover-
nance, and that it must “seize the opportunity” (shenshi duoshi, bawo jiyu
审时度势, 把握机遇, Tan Youzhi p. 37) offered by this “strategic window”
(zhanlüe zhi chuang 战略之窗, Shen Yi p. 153). For Huang Zhixiong: 
The place occupied by China in the chessboard of international reg-
ulation of cyberspace (wangluo kongjian guoji guize boyi 网络空间
国际规则博弈) determines its place and power in the future interna-
tional order of cyberspace. (p. 138)
In the article by Gao Wanglai, who looks at the issue from a cybersecurity
point of view, the sense of urgency is even more palpable, notably because
of risks of cyberwar:
The international community must establish international rules to
prevent rivalries from turning into a global armed conflict. (...) China
must seize this historic moment (lishi qiji 历史契机) and actively join
in this process in order to guarantee that the rules of cyberspace rep-
resent the interests of China and other developing countries. (p. 57;
p. 61)
Moreover, the authors propose to reform existing Internet governance in-
stitutions and to establish a diplomatic dialogue on cybersecurity within
the United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations. They also
encourage bilateral and multilateral dialogue with such countries as the US,
Great Britain, South Korea, and BRICS countries. 
China, the “common interest of humanity,” and
intergovernmental governance
Considering that the multistakeholder model is regarded with suspicion
in this group of articles, the great majority of the authors studied here ad-
vocate the establishment of an intergovernmental framework for Internet
governance, with some variations depending on their disciplinary back-
ground and focus. 
For example, the solutions envisioned by authors who privilege a cyber-
security approach, such as Gao Wanglai, are often inspired by other strategic
fields of diplomacy such as non-proliferation or money-laundering, where
intergovernmental frameworks have been used to guarantee peaceful res-
olution of conflicts, including the UN and regional and bilateral dialogues.
Gao also mentions the possible participation (canyu 参与 p. 58) of other
parties such as transnational corporations, NGOs, scientists, or law experts,
but only in a consultative role. 
In an article that focuses on Internet global governance mainly from the
perspective of the increasing militarisation of networks, Liu Yangyue and
Yang Yixin state that the return of states and of the notion of cybersover-
eignty is an inevitable trend: 
At the institutional level, international organisations of Internet gov-
ernance such as ICANN will inevitably go through a legitimacy crisis,
and it will be difficult to maintain the status quo. Deep reform, or
even complete replacement by institutions that represent the inter-
ests of sovereign states constitutes a reasonable prospect for insti-
tutional change. (p. 6)
While most authors do not consider cyberwar a credible eventuality, many
see the establishment of an intergovernmental model as a solution to main-
tain peace and social order in a way that is not so different from the notion
of peaceful coexistence advocated by Huang Huikang at the Budapest con-
ference. Some also find supporting arguments in the fact that nation-states
and other actors are implementing more and more territorialisation meas-
ures such as Internet filtering, server localisation, and nation-based copy-
right protections. (61)
For instance, Wang Mingguo argues that even the United States is no longer
defending the idea of a global public domain (quanqiu gongyu 全球公域): 
It would be more accurate to consider the Internet a condominium
resource (gongguan ziyuan 共管资源), a shared structure that lacks
common rules and governance, and the basic infrastructure of which
is under the control of nation states. (...) The Internet is undergoing
a process of “re-sovereignisation and re-territorialisation” (zai
zhuquanhua he zai lingtuhua 再主权化和再领土化). (...) At the or-
ganisational level, [China should] insist on giving a leading position
to the United Nations, and try to turn the UN’s International
Telecommunications Union into the basic organisation in the con-
struction of the global Internet governance system. (...) Only with
the active support of the international community, and in particular
of developing countries, can the ITU take a leading role in the sphere
of Internet governance. (pp. 69; 70; 71; 72) 
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Some authors do relate the establishment of intergovernmental Internet
governance to the notion of a global common interest, and try to balance
more universal notions related to citizens’ rights, such as freedom of speech
or privacy, with national interests in a rather politically conservative way. 
Looking at the issue from the perspective of legal studies, Huang Zhixiong
underlines that “the proposals to apply international laws to cyberspace re-
flect the objective need to build an international order in cyberspace, and
it corresponds to the common interests of human societies” (fuhe renlei
shehui de gongtong liyi 符合人类社会的共同利益 p. 136). He recommends
a strategy based on the establishment of an international law of cyberspace
through the United Nations and bilateral cooperation. As national sover-
eignty is the cornerstone of international law, such a framework would en-
able every country to establish its own domestic rules according to its level
of development, traditions, culture, etc. (pp. 138-139). In his view, interna-
tional law needs to be adapted and individual freedoms need to be balanced
with public order and security concerns, with a view to building a “harmo-
nious” (hexie 和谐) and “inclusive” (gongjin 共进) cyberspace (p. 140). Here,
the “common interest of humanity” is stated in terms that are compatible
with the political motto of former Chinese President Hu Jintao, “building a
harmonious society,” which was often used in the 2000s to justify measures
of policing, public order, and political stability. The author then proceeds to
a number of recommendations to develop cyberdiplomacy and related re-
search, to publish a Chinese cyberspace strategy, to recognise the important
role of non-state actors and “soft-law” in cyberspace, and finally to develop
rule by law (yi fa zhi guo 依法治国) in China, which is a core concept of the
Xi Jinping leadership.
From an international relations perspective, Tan Youzhi analyses the ten-
sion between necessary interconnectivity and concerns of nation-states: 
It is reasonable that countries will value and publicly defend cy-
bersovereignty, but this contradicts the model of collaborative gov-
ernance that has been proposed so far by sovereign countries and
territories and international organisations, institutions, individuals,
and various actors. The common interest of humanity (renlei gong-
tong liyi 人类共同利益) can only prevail over small calculations by
nation-states if the latter voluntarily abandon or delegate some part
of their governance to other organisations and find the best point of
balance and the greatest common divisor between them. (pp. 32-
33)
Tan’s final recommendations are nonetheless more oriented towards
restoring China’s right to participate in the definition of rules (zhengqu 
wangluo kongjian quanqiu zhili guoji guize de zhiding quan 争取网络空间
全球治理国际规则的制定权 p. 37) than towards pushing for reciprocally
giving up some degree of sovereignty: 
Together we must push for the definition of international rules and
regulations of cyberspace, an international supervision system of cy-
berspace, and a global sanctions program, and finally push for the
realisation of a global governance system of cyberspace to effectively
limit the superpowers’ unilateral actions (danbian zhuyi xingjing 单
边主义行经 pp. 37-38). 
Like many authors in this sample, Tan also encourages international co-
operation, particularly on a technical level, as well as investment to enhance
domestic innovation in order to eradicate technological dependency (nuli
baituo shouzhi yu ren de beidong jumian 努力摆脱受制于人的被动局面
p. 41). 
In all the studied contributions, the term “intergovernmental platforms”
mainly refers to the United Nations International Telecommunications
Union, but can also include multilateral and bilateral dialogues such as the
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Most authors also do not
exclude direct cooperation with the private sector, thus replicating the all-
encompassing strategy that is identified in the analysis of the American
model, for example in Lu Chuanying’s article: 
China participates in Internet global governance, both as a develop-
ing country and as a new cyberpower (xinxing daguo 新兴大国).(…)
[China should] promote international cooperation and dialogue, par-
ticipate in the definition of standards and rules of the Internet,
change its passive position in the definition of international stan-
dards, actively enhance its right to speak on the international stage,
and increase our country’s weight in the renewed structure of future
cyberspace. (62)
In the strategy proposed by Lu Chuanying, China would count on various
possible forms of alliances, from the support of developing countries to
more developed “new cyberpowers” such as Russia, which was one of the
promoters of the Code of Conduct. 
Multistakeholderism as a strategy 
While the implementation of a more intergovernmental framework is
often considered a more long-term goal, if possible at all, some authors
hold that in the short term China should increase participation in the cur-
rently existing platforms and possibly try to change them from within. 
In the article that probably expresses the most support for the idea of
multistakeholder representation, Cai Cuihong 蔡翠红 (63) exposes the mul-
tiple ways in which the interests and values of different actors can be di-
vided or opposed in the field of cyberspace governance. Her vision of the
future of global Internet governance is nonetheless optimistic, as she be-
lieves that the confrontation of these points of view and the interdepend-
ence between all actors can be overcome through a suitably balanced
governance model: 
The differences in power and interests in cyberspace between the
different institutional actors means that only an Internet governance
model that can balance the diverse, multi-level cooperation of states,
the market, and society can be really effective and acceptable to all
parties. States cannot exist separately from the market and society.
The market is the effective carrier of economic development for
states, and the economy is the basic guarantee of the strength of
states. At the same time, states exist through society and are con-
trolled by society. (64)
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Shen Yi offers a more strategic and sophisticated perspective on the ne-
cessity of participating in currently existing institutions. For him, both un-
conditional support and opposition to the current order are infeasible. China
should:
(…) take security-oriented governance (zhili mouqiu anquan 治理谋
求安全) as a starting point and embrace the principle of common
heritage of humanity (renlei gongtong yichan 人 类 共 同 遗 产 ).
[Through strategic coordination with new great powers, it would be
possible to] unite and coalesce like-minded countries, such as devel-
oping countries with a low technological level and high dependency
on the Internet, and which are concerned about how the US takes
advantage of their hegemony. (...) The objective of this strategy
would be to put data sovereignty at the centre (yi shuju zhuquan
wei hexin 以数据主权为核心), to build an open and attractive Inter-
net governance ecosystem (juyou youhuoli de kaifang de wangluo
kongjian zhili shengtai xitong 具有诱惑力的开放的网络空间治理生
态系统), and to strive for the improvement of global Internet gover-
nance on an open basis, to guarantee mutual security and ordered
development. (pp. 154-155).
Among the potential difficulties envisioned by Shen Yi is the fact that giv-
ing more power to sovereign governance or establishing supervision by an
intergovernmental organisation such as the UN could easily lead the US to
stop its withdrawal from global Internet affairs (and indeed, the United
States has clearly expressed that multistakeholderism is a condition for its
withdrawal from IANA stewardship; NGOs and rights advocates also have
shown an ability to mobilise whenever intergovernmental schemes were
pushed forward at important summits). So in Shen Yi’s opinion, other coun-
tries should “find another non-governmental institution, including an en-
terprise or a private corporation, that would be powerful enough to try and
compete with the level of control of Internet governance that the US has
inherited, and to use innovative, non-traditional means to push for, guar-
antee, and realise the data sovereignty of states.” This wording suggests
that a formally multistakeholder organisation could actually serve the
strategic interests of China if it contributes to balance the power of the US
over Internet governance.
In a 2015 article, Shen Yi further expresses the view that it is impossible
for China to replace the US as the global leader of cyberspace. In the short
term, it is only possible to develop substitutes in certain key sectors, such
as Huawei for traffic hubs, in order to put data transmission technologies
into Chinese hands. This means that: 
The relevant departments should establish the necessary adjust-
ments for governance, design of infrastructure, and methods. These
adjustments should not only correspond to the interests of China,
but also to the international rules of the game, at least from a formal
and procedural point of view. (65)
Shen Yi’s analysis clearly indicates a strategic vision of how China can defend
its interests within the current state of global Internet governance institutions,
without having to be vocal about replacing the whole system, and instead
trying to change it from within. His vision seems to strike a chord in certain
political spheres, as he is quoted in prominent Chinese articles (66) and has also
expressed his opinions in the Huffington Post (67) for a global audience. 
It also echoes the tone of editorials and analyses published in various ven-
ues by Chinese experts. For many, with limited strategic room to manoeuvre,
and lacking an existing global, legal, or diplomatic framework to rely on, it
seems more fruitful to adopt a flexible strategy where concrete issues are
dealt with in a very ad hoc way, using all possible levers, from implementing
filtering measures to intergovernmental dialogue (particularly on cyber-
crime and cybersecurity) and to hands-on involvement of the private sector
in the more technical operational decisions of Internet governance. For ex-
ample, Li Yan (68) argues that China never opposed the multistakeholder
model, but defends a “flexible, pragmatic, multiple application” of it, “elim-
inating the misconception of its ‘statist’ view of the Internet, while also
strengthening cooperation with both governmental and non-governmental
[Internet governance] actors and supporting the reform of ICANN.” (69)
Conclusion: Global order, cybersovereignty
and public interest 
Overall, these articles remain relatively general in the way they deal with
global Internet governance. There are relatively few in-depth remarks on
the sociological, economic, legal, or organisational functioning of ICANN,
the IGF, or Netmundial, for example. International relations and legal per-
spectives are in the majority, with more attention paid to the articulation
between the various multistakeholder, international, and bilateral platforms
of discussion in relation to the strategic interests of China.
This scholarship reflects a rather dichotomous and culturalist vision of the
post-Cold War world, where the United States and other Western countries
such as those in Europe (or sometimes Japan) have acquired a hegemonic
position thanks to their technological superiority, and draw benefits from
the apparent lack of order in cyberspace. China, frequently seen abroad as
the main source of cybersecurity issues with its increasing technological
capabilities, is depicted in this group of articles as the main victim of West-
ern technological superiority, in line with official discourse.
The notions of common good and public domain are generally treated with
suspicion as concepts put forward by the global hegemons to perpetuate
their technological, political, and cultural superiority. In most cases, the global
common good is equated at best with international peace or peaceful co-
existence, concepts very commonly used in Chinese diplomacy, and trans-
lates into a preference for multilateral – or intergovernmental – governance
frameworks, such as the United Nations International Telecommunications
Union. When support is expressed for China’s active and open cooperation
within the existing “multistakeholder” governance institutions, it is more out
of the need to influence Internet governance in the short term, and out of
confidence that China has enough assets (with its private sectors and sizeable
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market) and allies (with like-minded countries) to defend its interests, than
out of genuine belief in the global public usefulness of such institutions. 
The frequent use of the concept of hegemony is therefore not associated
with any critique of the capitalist world order, as is the case in Gramscian
theory and in the political economy of communication. Instead, it reflects
a “realist” vision of international relations where states, as the only relevant
actors, mainly act to defend their interests and security in a digital world
primarily qualified as anarchic (which in itself is a problematic statement).
In this context, cybersecurity and social order are presented as pressing is-
sues that require the elaboration of a more sophisticated Chinese cyber-
strategy.
The ideas expressed in this sampling of academic articles seem to provide
some inspiration to the higher circles of Chinese politics. The concept of cy-
bersovereignty was promoted to the top of the agenda at the 2nd World In-
ternet Conference, (70) where Xi Jinping himself delivered a speech entitled
“Promoting the transformation of the global system of Internet governance”
(tuijin quanqiu hulianwang zhili tixi biange 推进全球互联网治理体系变革),
which contains key concepts outlined here:
(…) respecting each country’s right to choose its own internet de-
velopment path, its own internet management model, its own public
policies on the Internet, and to participate on an equal basis in the
governance of international cyberspace – avoiding cyber-hegemony,
and avoiding interference in the internal affairs of other countries. (71)
Year on year it seems that the Chinese leadership is showing more confi-
dence and assertiveness in putting forward the cybersovereignty agenda in
every possible venue. For instance, the negotiations for the Ten-Year Review
of the World Summit on the Information Society, a forum on Internet gov-
ernance organised under the umbrella of the United Nations, represented
a significant step forward, as the word “multilateral” was included once in
the final report. (72)
This compromise highlights that China can find alliances in global gover-
nance institutions. In the sampled articles, China is qualified alternatively
as a developing country (fazhanzhong guojia 发展中国家), a “newly devel-
oped country” (xinxing fazhan guojia 新兴发展国家), or a new cyberpower
(wangluo daguo 网络大国). The digital divide, which impairs the former, as
well as the lack of recognition, which is deemed unfair to the latter, both
serve as arguments in favour of rebalancing the Internet world order. This
somewhat ambivalent positioning is seen as advantageous to China in its
quest for allies. Indeed, China’s positions are supported by other developing
countries such as some members of the Group of 77 (which gathers devel-
oping countries), (73) as well as more advanced cyberpowers such as Russia.
True, its allies are found among relatively less powerful countries in terms
of Internet development, and they remain in the minority. In particular, al-
though European countries are more nuanced than the United States in
their support for the multistakeholder model, and insist more often on the
role states can play to defend the interests of citizens, they still stand firmly
against the idea of a purely intergovernmental governance model. (74) Chi-
nese netizens noted that most of the heads of state who attended the
Wuzhen World Internet Conference were in fact from countries where the
Internet is less developed, and even proposed, not without irony, to rename
it the “Third World” Internet Conference. (75) Short of more powerful allies,
changing the framework of Internet governance to an intergovernmental
model may remain an inaccessible goal.
However, China can also take advantage of the (still ill-defined) multi-
stakeholder scheme to advance its agenda through other actors, in partic-
ular in the private sector, as suggested by the apparent rapprochement of
Xi Jinping and Lu Wei, the head of the Cyberspace Administration of China,
with the American giants of the Internet during the Chinese-American tech-
nology forum in September 2015. (76) The recent trip to China by Mark
Zuckerberg, Facebook's CEO, (77) (which was mocked in the Chinese social
media), also suggests that the biggest global Internet businesses may find
some of their interests converging with those of the Chinese leadership. To
assess the influence and power of China in this multistakeholder Internet
governance context, it is no longer enough to look at intergovernmental al-
liances alone. One needs instead to look at specific policy measures and at
what kind of actors push them forward – governments but also private com-
panies, experts, and NGOs, among others. In this global and complex move-
ment to reshape the Internet world order, China might find itself much less
isolated than during the last decade.
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